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Verifiable blind quantum computing allows a client with poor quantum devices to delegate universal quantum
computing to a remote quantum server in such a way that the client’s privacy is protected and the honesty of the
server is verified. In existing protocols, the client has to send single-qubit states to the server. These states might
be decohered by the channel noise. Furthermore, the client hides some “trap” qubits in the server’s register so
that the client can detect the server’s deviation. In reality, however, these trap qubits are disturbed by imperfect
operations by the server, which reduces the probability that the client accepts the honest server. To solve these
problems, we propose a new gadget that allows the client to remotely prepare encoded logical single-qubit states
in the server’s place. Importantly, in our fault-tolerant verifiable blind quantum computing protocol, the client
needs only the ability of physical single-qubit measurements inX and Z bases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of its high maintenance, a first-generation quan-
tum computer would be realized in a “cloud style”: a client
with poor quantum devices delegates universal quantum com-
puting to a remote quantum server. In such a cloud quantum
computing, protecting client’s privacy is of prime importance.
Blind quantum computing (BQC) protocols guarantee blind-
ness, i.e., information-theoretic security of the client’s input,
quantum algorithm, and output. So far, various BQC proto-
cols [1–30] have been proposed. In particular, the Broadbent-
Fitzsimons-Kashefi (BFK) protocol [2], which is based on
measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC) [31], has
successfully allowed the client to be almost classical. Subse-
quently, the client’s quantum ability [2, 4, 7, 9, 14, 17, 27, 32],
communication complexity [10, 11, 21], composable secu-
rity [33, 34], and applications [35, 36] of BQC have been
studied. Proof-of-principle experiments for several BQC pro-
tocols have already been demonstrated using four photonic
qubits [12, 37, 38].
In addition to the information-theoretic security, there is an-
other important requirement, namely, the verifiability, which
means that the client can verify whether the server honestly
performed the delegated quantum computing or not. In fact,
verification methods [3, 12, 13, 15, 18, 22, 24–26, 28, 30] of
BQC have been actively studied. They are important not only
in the cryptographic context, but also for the understanding
of the foundation of quantum physics [1, 29]. Experimentally
verifying the correctness of a physical theory is essential in
physics, but verifying a quantum many-body theory is a non-
trivial task due to the high complexity of quantummany-body
systems. Verification methods of BQC are nice theoretical
models for studying such a problem.
BQC combined with the verification protocol is called ver-
ifiable BQC (VBQC). Fitzsimons and Kashefi have proposed
a VBQC protocol, which is called the FK protocol [3]. In
the FK protocol, the client generates ten kinds of single-qubit
states
{|0〉, |1〉} ∪ {(|0〉+ eikpi/4|1〉)/
√
2 | 0 ≤ k ≤ 7, k ∈ Z}
and sends them to the server. The sever entangles them with
the controlled-Z (CZ) gates to prepare an appropriate graph
state, which is used forMBQC. Since some of states generated
by the client are the Z-basis states and are not entangled by
the server’s CZ gates, some single-qubit states surrounded
by the Z-basis states are isolated from the graph state, which
are called trap qubits. Accordingly, the client can completely
predict measurement outcomes on trap qubits. On the other
hand, the server does not know which qubits are trap qubits.
As a result, if the server attempts to perform deviation, the
server ends up disturbing the state of trap qubits with high
probability. Therefore, the client can verify whether the server
follows the correct procedure or not by checking outcomes of
single-qubit measurements on trap qubits (See Appendix A
for the detail of the FK protocol).
One problem of the existing VBQC protocols based on the
trap technique [3, 12, 13, 18, 22, 24] is that they are not fault-
tolerant. If the client sends the bare single-qubit states to the
server, they decohere in the quantum channel from the client
to the server. Another problem of using bare qubits is that if
trap qubits are not logically encoded, even the honest server
is rejected by the client since in reality the server’s operations
are imperfect. If the client could generate and send logically
encoded ten kinds of states,
{|0L〉, |1L〉} ∪ {(|0L〉+ eikpi/4|1L〉)/
√
2 | 0 ≤ k ≤ 7, k ∈ Z},(1)
to the server, the fault-tolerance is maintained, but it is unre-
alistic since the client has to perform entangling operations.
In this paper, to solve the problem, we propose a new gadget
that allows the client to remotely prepare the ten logical states
of Eq. (1) in the server’s place in such a way that the server
cannot learn which states are prepared. These logical single-
qubit states are encoded in the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS)
code [39, 40]. Importantly, in the gadget, the client needs
only the ability of physical single-qubit measurements in X
2and Z bases. We construct a fault-tolerant VBQC protocol
by combining the gadget to the FK protocol. Since the client
of the FK protocol needs no quantum operation after sending
ten kinds of states to the server, thus constructed fault-tolerant
VBQC protocol requires the client to have only the ability of
single-qubit measurements inX and Z bases.
An intuitive idea of our gadget is as follows (For details, see
Sec. II). First, if the server is honest, he generates logical Bell
pairs and sends one half of each of them to the client. Thanks
to the transversality of the CSS code, the client can prepare
logical X- and Z-basis states (up to correctable errors) in the
server’s place by only physical single-qubit measurements in
X and Z bases. Since non-Clifford measurements cannot be
done in the transversal way, all of logical states in Eq. (1) can-
not be prepared in the server’s place in this way. We therefore
introduce our new protocol that enables the server to generate
ten logical single-qubit states of Eq. (1) from logical X- and
Z-basis states (Details of this protocol is explained in Sec. II,
and see Fig. 1). In this way, the client can remotely prepare
ten logical single-qubit states of Eq. (1) in the client’s place on
which they can run the FK protocol. One might think that the
halves of logical Bell pairs could decohere during the channel
from the server to the client. However, by virtue of the CSS
code, the client can correct errors via classical processing af-
ter the transversal {X,Z}-basis measurements, similarly to
the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) protocol [41, 42] for quantum
key distribution (QKD). For example, if independent X and
Z errors occur in the channel, the client’s measurement appa-
ratus, and the server’s devices, the proposed protocol tolerates
an error rate up to ∼ 11% [39, 43] in total. In other words,
the acceptance rate can be successfully amplified by the al-
most classical client even if there are the channel noise, and
imperfections of the client’s measurement apparatus and the
server’s devices.
By combining our gadget to the FK protocol, we construct
a fault-tolerant VBQC protocol in Sec. III. Our fault-tolerant
VBQC protocol requires the client to have the ability of only
single-qubit measurements inX and Z bases. Such a require-
ment is the minimum one. One might point out that the client
in other BQC protocols that use multiple servers [2, 9, 17]
is more classical than ours. However, in these protocols, a
massage sent from the client to a server should not be leaked
to another server. To guarantee such a security, information-
theoretically secure classical communication should be estab-
lished between the client and each server. In order to achieve
such a secure classical communication, quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) should be ultimately employed. For example, if
BB84 [41] is used, the client anyway has to perform X- and
Z-basis measurements.
Note that in Ref. [27], a protocol was proposed that enables
the server to generate eight kinds of single-qubit states
{(|0〉+ eikpi/4|1〉)/
√
2 | 0 ≤ k ≤ 7, k ∈ Z}
from two kinds of single-qubit states sent from the client. The
protocol is useful for the BFK protocol, but not for the FK
protocol, since the FK protocol needs the Z-basis state prepa-
ration in addition to the above eight states. On the other hand,
after the first version of this paper appeared on arXiv, a VBQC
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FIG. 1: The quantum circuit used in our gadget. For
simplicity, we omit the subscript L. In the graph state
representation at the top, solid and dashed circles indicate the
output state |B〉 and the measured qubits, respectively.
protocol that utilizes only the above eight states has been pro-
posed [30]. It might be possible to construct a fault-tolerant
VBQC protocol by combining results in Refs. [27, 30]. It is
an interesting open problem.
Our fault-tolerant VBQC protocol is based on the FK pro-
tocol. There is another type of VBQC protocols that are based
on the stabilizer testing [7, 25, 26, 28]. In these protocols,
the server sends the client many copies of graph states. The
client randomly samples some of copies and check their sta-
bilizers. If all stabilizer measurements give correct values, re-
maining graph states are guaranteed to be close to the correct
graph states. Recently, Fujii and Hayashi have proposed its
fault-tolerant version [28]. Our protocol does not supersede
theirs, and vice versa, since the VBQC protocols based on the
FK protocol and those based on the stabilizer testing are dif-
ferent: the latter achieves simpler proofs of the verifiability
and the stronger security based on the no-signaling principle,
while the former is free from on-line quantum communica-
tion, i.e., no quantum communication is necessary after the
client decides her algorithm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
explain our new gadget to remotely prepare ten logical states
in the server’s place. In Sec. III, as a main result of the present
paper, we construct a fault-tolerant VBQC protocol by com-
bining our gadget and the FK protocol. In the same section,
we show its fault-tolerance and discuss its loss-tolerance. We
then show the correctness (Sec. IV), blindness (Sec. V), and
verifiability (Sec. VI) of our VBQC protocol.
II. GADGET
In this section, we explain our gadget to remotely prepare
ten logical states in Eq. (1). Our gadget runs as follows:
1. Alice (the client) randomly chooses five bits
(c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) ∈ {0, 1}×5, where ci is chosen
to be 0 with probability qi for each i = 1, 2, . . . , 5.
Here, q1 = q5 = p/(1 − p) (0 < p < 1/2),
3q2 = q4 = 1 − p, and q3 = 1 − p′ (0 < p′ < 1).
Note that p and p′ are specified later. Next, she chooses
two sets of five bits (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) ∈ {0, 1}×5
and (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5) ∈ {0, 1}×5 independently and
uniformly random.
2. Alice and Bob (the server) repeat the following steps for
i = 1, 2, . . . , 5.
2-a. Bob sends Alice one half of the logical Bell pair
|Φ+L〉 ≡
|0L0L〉+ |1L1L〉√
2
encoded in the CSS code with length l through a
quantum channel.
2-b. If ci = 0, Alice measures the ith logical qubit
sent from Bob in the ZL = Z
⊗l basis. After
that, she performs error correction through classi-
cal processing to obtain the ith reliable measure-
ment outcome oi. She then requests Bob to per-
formXai⊕oiL Z
ri
L on his ith half.
On the other hand, if ci = 1, she measures
in XL = X
⊗l and requests Bob to perform
XriL Z
ai⊕oi
L on his ith half.
Now Bob has
|Ai,L〉 ≡ HciL XaiL |0L〉,
whereHL = H
⊗l is the logical Hadamard gate.
3. Bob implements a quantum circuit composed of SL ≡√
ZL, TL ≡
√
SL, HL, Λ(ZL), and ZL-basis measure-
ments, as shown in Fig. 1. Here, Λ(ZL) is the logi-
cal CZ gate. He then obtains measurement outcomes
(s1, s2, s4, s5) ∈ {0, 1}×4. Let the state of the 3rd out-
put qubit of the circuit in Fig. 1 be |BL〉. The explicit
form of |BL〉 depends on {ai}, {ci}, and {si} (See Ta-
ble I). He sends s1, s2, s4, and s5 to Alice through a
classical channel. If s1 = s2 = s4 = s5 = 0, he keeps
|BL〉. Otherwise, he discards it.
In Table I and hereafter, we define
|+k,L〉 ≡ (|0L〉+ eikpi/4|1L〉)/
√
2 (0 ≤ k ≤ 7, k ∈ Z).
III. FAULT-TOLERANT VBQC PROTOCOL
In this section, as the main result of this paper, we propose
a fault-tolerant VBQC protocol by incorporating our gadget
in the FK protocol (See also Fig. 2). It runs as follows:
1. Let ND be the number of logical Z-basis states used
in the FK protocol. Let (N − ND) be that of states
{|+k,L〉} used in the FK protocol. Alice and Bob run
the gadget given in Sec. II with p and p′ chosen such
that
ND
N
= 1− 4p2(1− p′).
(c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) |BL〉
(1) (0/1, 0/1, 0, 0/1, 0/1) Xa3L |0L〉
(2) (0, 1, 1, 0/1, 0/1) Xa1⊕a2L |0L〉
(3) (0/1, 0, 1, 1, 0) Xa4⊕a5L |0L〉
(4) (1, 1, 1, 1, 0) Xa4⊕a5L |0L〉
(5) (0/1, 0, 1, 0, 0/1) Za2⊕a3⊕a4L |+0,L〉
(6) (0/1, 0, 1, 1, 1) Za2⊕a3⊕a4⊕a5L |+2,L〉
(7) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0/1) Xa2L Z
a1⊕a3⊕a4
L |+1,L〉
(8) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) Xa2L Z
a1⊕a2⊕a3⊕a4⊕a5
L |+3,L〉
TABLE I: The explicit form of |BL〉 when
s1 = s2 = s4 = s5 = 0. Here, 0/1 means that 0 or 1.
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FIG. 2: Our fault-tolerant VBQC protocol. Here, the
quantum operation represents the quantum circuit shown in
Fig. 1. A white colored and a gray colored circles represent a
state |+k,L〉 and a logical Z-basis state, respectively. Two
black colored circles connected with each other represent a
logical Bell pair. Q.C. and C.C. are abbreviations of quantum
communication and classical communication, respectively.
2. Alice and Bob repeat step 1 until ND logical Z-basis
states and (N − ND) states {|+k,L〉} are prepared at
Bob’s side [44].
3. Alice and Bob perform the FK protocol using logical
qubits prepared in step 2 (See Appendix A for the detail
of the FK protocol).
As mentioned earlier, VBQC protocols have to satisfy the
blindness and verifiability. In addition to them, VBQC pro-
tocols should also satisfy the correctness, which means that
if the client and the server follow the correct procedure, the
client can obtain the correct output. Our fault-tolerant VBQC
protocol indeed satisfies these three requirements, as we show
later in Secs. IV, V, and VI.
Now we explain the fault tolerance of our protocol. By
virtue of the error correction, we can amplify the acceptance
rate even in the presence of Bob’s imperfection and the quan-
tum channel noise. Note that when we argue the fault tol-
erance, Bob is assumed to be honest and follows the correct
procedure, because otherwise Bob can perform any deviation
and therefore the fault tolerance is trivially impossible.
Let us consider the simplest case where errors occur inde-
pendently in the quantum channel and the server’s devices
4with probability perror. Without error correction, the accep-
tance rate decreases as O((1 − perror)N/3) in the FK pro-
tocol [3]. On the other hand, in our fault-tolerant VBQC
protocol, qubits are always encoded into an error-correcting
code. Let pL < e
−κ be the logical error probability per
elementary operation, whose overhead is at most a polyno-
mial function of κ. Since the number of operations is at most
poly(N), the acceptance rate under error correction becomes
O((1 − poly(N)pL)N/3) ∼ O(epoly(N)pLN/3) (More rigor-
ously, according to fault-tolerant theory, we can simulate ideal
quantum computing with an exponentially small additive er-
ror with respect to l1 norm with a polynomial overhead if the
amount of noise measured, for example, by the diamond norm
is sufficiently smaller than a certain threshold value). That is,
if we want to satisfy pL < O(1/poly(N)), we can amplify the
acceptance rate using a polylog overhead with respect toN as
long as Bob’s imperfection and the quantum channel noise are
small enough. For clarity, let us consider the case, where X
and Z errors are introduced independently with probability
perror as channel noise. If perror < 11% [39, 43], pL can be
reduced exponentially with κ. Not only the channel noise, but
also errors at Bob’s operation can also be made fully fault-
tolerant by doing the FK protocol using logical qubits in a
fault-tolerant way [46, 47]. While we here consider a specific
error model, a similar argument holds in general. If Bob’s
deviation or errors are correctable, the acceptance rate is am-
plified close to unit. Otherwise, the verification protocol auto-
matically rejects Bob’s output.
Furthermore, we consider an effect of loss in the quantum
channel. Since a logical qubit sent from Bob to Alice is com-
posed of polylog(N) qubits, our fault-tolerant VBQC proto-
col is not efficient for a lossy quantum channel. To make it
efficient for loss, we modify our gadget as follows: First, if
Alice wants to prepare a logical X(Z)-basis state at Bob’s
side, she measures one half of a bare Bell pair |Φ+〉 sent from
Bob in the X(Z)-basis until l qubits are prepared at Bob’s
side. Then, she tells Bob which qubits are reached at her
side. Second, Bob generates |Φ+L〉 at his side. Then, Bob
performs quantum teleportation on one qubit of logical one
half of |Φ+L〉 and a remaining one half of |Φ+〉, whose another
one half reaches Alice’s side, l times. Finally, according to
measurement outcomes of Alice’s measurements and Bob’s
quantum teleportations, she requests Bob to perform the log-
ical Pauli operator as with the original gadget. As a result,
one logical qubit is prepared at Bob’s side as with the origi-
nal gadget. This modification decreases the mean number of
qubits required to prepare one logical qubit at Bob’s side from
(1/ploss)
l to l/ploss. Here, (1 − ploss) is the transmittance of
the quantum channel. Note that hereafter, we assume a loss-
less quantum channel for simplicity.
IV. CORRECTNESS
In this section, we show that our fault-tolerant VBQC pro-
tocol satisfies correctness. To this end, it is sufficient to show
that when Alice and Bob follow the correct procedure, Bob
obtains ten kinds of single-qubit states in Eq. (1). Note that
in this section, for the notational simplicity, we omit the sub-
script L of |BL〉, |+k,L〉, |0L〉, and |1L〉.
Theorem 1 If Alice and Bob follow the correct procedure in
Sec. II, {|+k〉}7k=0, |0〉, and |1〉 are each prepared at Bob’s
side with probability (N − ND)/(128N), ND/(32N), and
ND/(32N), respectively.
Proof. First, if Alice and Bob follow the correct procedure
in Sec. II, then Bob obtains the state |B〉. The explicit form
of |B〉 depends on {ai, ci}. It is summarized in Table I (See
Appendix B for details). As is shown in Table I, Alice can
prepare ten kinds of states, {|+k〉}7k=0, |0〉, and |1〉 in Bob’s
place.
Next, we calculate the probability for obtaining each |+k〉,
|0〉, and |1〉. The probability that |B〉 is in the computational
basis is
Pr[|B〉 = |0〉] + Pr[|B〉 = |1〉]
=
1
16
(Pr[c3 = 0] + Pr[c1 = 0, c2 = c3 = 1]
+Pr[c2 = c5 = 0, c3 = c4 = 1]
+Pr[c1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = 1, c5 = 0])
=
1
16
[
p′ +
1− 2p
1− p (1− p)(1− p
′)
+p(1− p′)(1− p)1− 2p
1− p
+
p
1− p(1 − p)(1− p
′)
1− 2p
1− p
]
=
1− 4p2(1− p′)
16
=
ND
16N
.
Since {ai} are chosen uniformly random,
Pr[|B〉 = |0〉] = Pr[|B〉 = |1〉] = ND
32N
.
By making a similar calculation,
Pr[|B〉 = |+k〉] =
N −ND
16N × 8
=
N −ND
128N
for each k ∈ {0, · · ·, 7}. 
V. BLINDNESS
In this section, we show the blindness of our VBQC pro-
tocol. Remember that, as is explained in Sec. III, our fault-
tolerant VBQC protocol is the combination of the gadget
(Sec. II) and the FK protocol. The blindness is shown in three
steps. First, in Sec. VA, we introduce a virtual VBQC proto-
col that is equal to our VBQC protocol except that the gadget
of Sec. II is replaced with another “virtual” gadget. Second, in
Sec. VB, we show that the blindness of our VBQC is reduced
5to that of the virtual VBQC protocol. In Sec. VC, we show
the blindness of the virtual VBQC protocol. As in the previ-
ous section, we omit the subscript L of quantum states (e.g.
|Ai,L〉) and operators (e.g. HL and XL) for the notational
simplicity.
A. Virtual VBQC protocol
In this subsection, we explain a virtual VBQC protocol.
The virtual VBQC protocol is equivalent to our fault-tolerant
VBQC protocol explained in Sec. III except that the gadget is
replaced with the following virtual gadget:
1. Alice sends Bob five states {|Ai〉 ≡ HciXai|0〉}5i=1
through the quantum channel. {ai}5i=1 is chosen from
{0, 1}×5 uniformly random. c1 and c5 are chosen from
{0, 1}with probabilities (1−2p)/(1−p) and p/(1−p),
respectively. c2 and c4 are chosen from {0, 1} with
probabilities p and (1 − p), respectively. c3 is cho-
sen from {0, 1} with probabilities p′ and (1 − p′), re-
spectively. Here, p and p′ satisfies that ND/N =
1− 4p2(1− p′).
2. Bob performs step 3 of the (original) gadget explained
in Sec. II.
The difference between our gadget in Sec. II and the above
virtual gadget is that Alice sends five logical states to Bob,
while in our gadget of Sec. II Alice remotely prepares five
logical states by measuring halves of logical Bell pairs sent
from Bob.
B. Reduction of our VBQC protocol to the virtual VBQC
protocol
In this subsection, we show that the blindness of our fault-
tolerant VBQC protocol in Sec. III can be reduced to that of
the virtual VBQC protocol explained in Sec. VA. To this end,
it is sufficient to show that our gadget given in Sec. II can be
reduced to the virtual one given in Sec. VA, because other
steps of both VBQC protocols are the same. One might think
that this is trivially done by using the duality between the state
preparation and the measurement on a part of a shared en-
tangled state. However, this is not the case for the following
reason: Bob can perform any deviation on the Bell pair |Φ+〉
before sending one half of |Φ+〉 to Alice. In other words,
Bob sends one half of an arbitrary two-qubit state ρab instead
of one half of |Φ+〉. Here, subscripts a and b represent the
system, which is sent to Alice and is kept at Bob’s side, re-
spectively. By using Kraus representation, ρab can be written
as
ρab =
∑
j
Fj |Φ+〉ab〈Φ+|abF †j ,
where Fj ≡ 〈ej |cUabc|e0〉c. Here, |ej〉 (0 ≤ j) represents
an orthonormal basis state of an ancillary system, and Uabc
represents an unitary operator on the composite system of the
systems a, b, and c. By using the property such that
(Ia ⊗ V Tb )|Φ+〉ab = (Va ⊗ Ib)|Φ+〉ab,
Fj can be rewritten as the operator performed on only the sys-
tem b. Here, V represents an unitary operator. In other words,
ρab can be written as
ρab = Ia ⊗Fb(|Φ+〉ab〈Φ+|ab), (2)
where F is a super-operator. Since F is CP (completely-
positive) map, but it is not TP (trace-preserving) map in gen-
eral, we cannot interpret Eq. (2) such that Bob’s deviation,
i.e., trace-preserving completely positive (CPTP) map is al-
ways performed after sending one half of |Φ+〉 to Alice. In
fact, when ρab = |+ 0〉ab〈+0|ab,
F(·) = |0〉(〈0|+ 〈1|)(·)(|0〉+ |1〉)〈0|.
Here, |+〉 ≡ |+0〉. In this case, F is obviously a non-TP map.
However, thanks to random bits used by Alice in our gad-
get, which acts like twirling [45], we can show that the duality
between the state preparation and the measurement holds even
under Bob’s deviation as follows:
Theorem 2 (Pushing Bob’s deviation forward by Alice’s
randomization) Even if Bob sends Alice quantum states dif-
ferent from halves of Bell pairs, what Bob obtains in step 2
of the gadget in Sec. II can be written as E(|A〉〈A|), where
E is a TPCP map independent on the prepared state |A〉 ∈
{|+〉, |−〉, |0〉, |1〉}. Here, |−〉 ≡ |+4〉.
Proof. Hereafter for simplicity, we call the gadget of Sec. II
P2. We also call the virtual gadget of Sec. VA P1. Further-
more, we define the following modified virtual gadget which
we call P2’ (See Fig. 3):
1. Bob sends one half of |Φ+〉 through a quantum channel.
2. Alice generates |A〉 ∈ {|+〉, |−〉, |0〉, |1〉} at her side as
with P1. In order to send |A〉 to Bob, Alice performs
quantum teleportation (QT) with Bell measurement on
|A〉 and one half of |Φ+〉 sent from Bob.
P2’ is equivalent to P2 from Bob’s viewpoint (the equivalence
between (a) and (b) shown in Fig. 3). The equivalence be-
tween them is shown as follows. Let us consider the Bell
measurement on |A〉 (system 1) and one half of |Φ+〉 (sys-
tem 2) in QT. When |A〉 is aX-basis state, it can be written as
X-bais measurement on one half of |Φ+〉
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FIG. 3: A diagram of the proof of Theorem 2. The black and white circles represent the qubits prepared by Alice and Bob,
respectively, and E represents Bob’s deviation. For simplicity, we depict only one Bell pair, but, in general, Bob’s deviation is
applied to all Bell pairs and his ancilla qubits. (a) P2. RNG indicates a random number generator. (b) P2’, which is equivalent
to P2 from Bob’s viewpoint. BM indicates the Bell measurement. (c) BM is delegated to Bob, which only weakens security
compared to P2’. (d) P1. (c) can be regarded as a special case of P1.
Tr1
[
[I1I2 + (−1)o′X1X2](I1I2 + Z1Z2)
4
|A〉〈A|
]
+Tr1
[
[I1I2 + (−1)o′X1X2](I1I2 − Z1Z2)
4
|A〉〈A|
]
= Tr1
[
[I1I2 + (−1)o′X1X2](I1I2 + Z1Z2)
4
I1 + (−1)a′X1
2
]
+Tr1
[
[I1I2 + (−1)o′X1X2](I1I2 − Z1Z2)
4
I1 + (−1)a′X1
2
]
= 2× I2 + (−1)
a′⊕o′X2
4
=
I2 + (−1)a′⊕o′X2
2
. (3)
Similarly, when |A〉 is a Z-basis state, it can be written as
Z-bais measurement on one half of |Φ+〉
Tr1
[
(I1I2 +X1X2)[I1I2 + (−1)o′Z1Z2]
4
I1 + (−1)a′Z1
2
]
+ Tr1
[
(I1I2 −X1X2)[I1I2 + (−1)o′Z1Z2]
4
I1 + (−1)a′Z1
2
]
= 2× I2 + (−1)
a′⊕o′Z2
4
=
I2 + (−1)a′⊕o′Z2
2
. (4)
In P2’, two classical bits are sent to Bob per one Bell pair
to cancel the byproduct Pauli operator similarly to P2. From
Eqs. (3) and (4), a bit corresponding to r is chosen from {0, 1}
with a probability 1/2, respectively. Accordingly, from Bob’s
viewpoint, P2 and P2’ are completely the same. Here P2’
is further modified in such a way that the Bell measurement
is delegated to Bob, which only degrades the blindness and
verifiability (the reduction from (b) to (c) shown in Fig. 3).
Now, it can be regarded as a special case of P1 (the inclusion
of (c) in (d) shown in Fig. 3), because in P1, Bob’s arbitrary
deviation is taken into account. Accordingly, Bob’s deviation
in P2 is independent on the prepared four states as with it in
P1. More precisely, from the equivalence between P2 and P2’,
the state of a qubit prepared at Bob’s side after QT can be
written as
7∑
o˜1,o˜2
X o˜1b Z o˜2b 〈Φ+|a1a2X o˜1a1Z o˜2a1 (ρa1b ⊗ |A〉a2〈A|a2)|Φ+〉a1a2
=
∑
o˜1,o˜2
X o˜1b Z o˜2b 〈Φ+|a1a2X o˜1a1Z o˜2a1 (Ia1 ⊗Fb(|Φ+〉a1b〈Φ+|a1b)⊗ |A〉a2〈A|a2)|Φ+〉a1a2
=
∑
o˜1,o˜2
X o˜1b Z o˜2b 〈Φ+|a1a2Ia1 ⊗Fb(X o˜1a1Z o˜2a1 (|Φ+〉a1b〈Φ+|a1b))⊗ |A〉a2 〈A|a2 |Φ+〉a1a2
=
1
4
∑
o˜1,o˜2
X o˜1b Z o˜2b FbX o˜1b Z o˜2b (|A〉b〈A|b). (5)
Here, X o˜1(·) ≡ X o˜1(·)X o˜1 and Z o˜2(·) ≡ Z o˜2(·)Z o˜2 ,
where (o˜1, o˜2) ∈ {0, 1}×2. Since Fb is CP map,
1/4
∑
o˜1,o˜2
X o˜1b Z o˜2b FbX o˜1b Z o˜2b is also CP map. Next, we
show that 1/4
∑
o˜1,o˜2
X o˜1b Z o˜2b FbX o˜1b Z o˜2b is TP map. Let |ψ〉
be a single-qubit state. By using Eq. (2),
Tr

1
4
∑
o˜1,o˜2
X o˜1b Z o˜2b FbX o˜1b Z o˜2b (|ψ〉b〈ψ|b)


=
1
4
∑
o˜1,o˜2
Tr[FbX o˜1b Z o˜2b (|ψ〉b〈ψ|b)]
= Tr
[
Fb
(
Ib
2
)]
= Tr[ρb] = 1. (6)
From Eq. (6), unlike Eq. (2), Eq. (5) can be interpreted such
that TPCP map, which is independent of |A〉, is applied for a
qubit prepared by Alice as Bob’s deviation similar to P1. 
C. Blindness of the virtual VBQC protocol
Let ρab is the output of the virtual gadget where subscripts
a and b denote Alice’s and Bob’s systems, respectively, and
Alice’s classical registers are treated as quantum states. If Bob
is malicious and did not follow the correct procedure, ρab can
be any state. We define ρ
(FK)
ab , which is a state prepared in the
state-preparation step of the (original) FK protocol [3], by
ρ
(FK)
ab
≡ Eb
(
1∑
z=0
P [
√
p(z)|z〉a|z〉b] +
7∑
k=0
P [
√
p(k)|k〉a|+k〉b]
)
,
where P [|·〉] ≡ |·〉〈·|, and Eb represents Bob’s deviation
(TPCP map). Here, as mentioned earlier, subscripts a and
b denote Alice’s and Bob’s systems, respectively, and Alice’s
classical registers are treated as quantum states. Finally, let
Πb be any positive operator valued measure (POVM) element
performed on Bob’s system. In order to show the blindness of
the virtual VBQC protocol, it is sufficient to show
Tr[Πbρab] = Tr[Πbρ
(FK)
ab ]. (7)
For the virtual gadget, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 1 If Alice follows the procedure of the virtual gad-
get, its output state satisfies Eq. (7) for any POVM element
performed on Bob’s system.
Proof. We define Ub as the unitary operator performed in
Fig. 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Bob
performs deviation and projection to the case where s1 =
s2 = s4 = s5 = 0 after performing Ub (See Appendix C
or [3] for the reason). We define CP map E ′b as such oper-
ation. Before Z-basis measurements in Fig. 1, a state that is
composed of Alice’s registers and five qubits at Bob’s side can
be written as
ρab ∝ E ′b
(
Ub
5⊗
i=1
P
[√
p(ai)p(ci)|aici〉a(i) |Ai〉b(i)
]
U †b
)
,
where Alice’s system a and Bob’s system b are composed of
systems {a(i)}5i=1 and {b(i)}5i=1, respectively. Let ρab(3) ≡
Trb˜[ρab] be a reduced density operator obtained by taking the
partial trace over systems b˜ ≡ {b(1), b(2), b(4), b(5)}. From Ta-
ble I and taking the case where at least one of {s1, s2, s4, s5}
is not equal to 0 into account, it can be calculated as
ρab(3) =
1
P
Trb˜

E ′b

 1
16
∑
s,s′∈{0,1}×4
E ′s,s
′
a
(
1∑
z=0
P [
√
p(z)|z〉a|z〉b(3) ] +
7∑
k=0
P [
√
p(k)|k〉a|+k〉b(3) ]
)
⊗ |s1s2s4s5〉〈s′1s′2s′4s′5|b˜




≡ E˜a
(
ρ
(FK)
ab(3)
)
, (8)
where P is a probability where s1 = s2 = s4 = s5 = 0 is obtained, E˜a is a TPCP map performed on Alice’s system, and
8E ′s,s′a is an operation performed on Alice’s system depending
on s ≡ {s1, s2, s4, s5} and s′ ≡ {s′1, s′2, s′4, s′5}. Note that s
and s′ are independent of the form of ρ(FK). As shown in The-
orem 1, E ′0,0a = Ia, where I is the identity super-operator.
Accordingly,
Tr[Πb(3)ρab(3) ] = Tr[Πb(3)ρ
(FK)
ab(3)
]
is satisfied for any Bob’s POVM element Πb(3) . This means
that if the virtual gadget is used as the state-preparation step
of the FK protocol, it does not degrade blindness. 
From Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, the following theorem im-
mediately holds:
Theorem 3 Our fault-tolerant VBQC protocol satisifies the
blindness.
Note that although we consider only single run of our gadget
in above proofs, the similar argument also holds when Bob
performs deviation on all of logical Bell pairs used in multiple
run of our gadget.
VI. VERIFIABILITY
In this section, we show that our fault-tolerant VBQC pro-
tocol satisfies the verifiability. As in the previous section, we
first show the verifiability of the virtual VBQC protocol, and
then we reduce the verifiability of our fault-tolerant VBQC
protocol to that of the virtual one. Again, we omit the sub-
script L of quantum states and operators for the notational
simplicity.
For the virtual VBQC protocol, following lemma holds:
Lemma 2 The virtual VBQC protocol satisfies the verifiabil-
ity.
Proof. A detailed proof is given in Appendix C. Here, we ex-
plain intuitive ideas for the proof. Our proof is similar to that
of the verifiability of the original FK protocol [3]. Hereafter,
we briefly explain why the proof of the original FK protocol is
used to show Lemma 2. The virtual gadget in Sec. V satisfies
following two properties:
Remark 1 (i) When Alice and Bob follow the correct proce-
dure of the virtual gadget, an output state ρab that represents
classical-quantum correlation between Alice and Bob satisfies
that ρb = (I/2)
⊗log(dimρb). Here, ρb and dimρb represent the
reduced density operator for Bob’s system and dimension of
Bob’s system, respectively. (ii) Bob’s deviation is independent
of the states prepared by Alice.
The first property is derived from the fact that when Bob is
honest, Eb = Ib in Eq. (8). Furthermore, since Eb is indepen-
dent of {|Ai〉}, the second property is also satisfied. Note that
our gadget can be treated as a special case of the virtual one,
these two properties are also satisfied for the gadget in Sec. II.
These two properties are sufficient conditions to utilize
techniques used in proof of verifiability of the FK protocol [3].
Accordingly, they are important to show that our gadget does
not degrade verifiability of the FK protocol. Note that prop-
erty (i) is not always necessary for blindness. In fact, we do
not use property (i) to show blindness. The reason why these
two properties are required is as follows: For the FK protocol,
an average probability where Alice accepts an incorrect out-
come over her secret information is calculated to show verifia-
bility. Here, we define ν, ρ(ν), T ,W , and Π as Alice’s secret
information, an initial state prepared in Bob’s place, an ideal
operation performed by Alice and honest Bob, Bob’s devia-
tion, and a projector composed of a projector performed in the
FK protocol and a projector corresponding to the event where
Alice accepts an incorrect outcome, respectively. In the FK
protocol, it is assumed that W is independent of ν. In order
to satisfy this assumption for our gadget, we require property
(ii). SinceW can be decomposed by multi-qubit Pauli opera-
tors, in order to calculate the average probability, we have to
calculate ∑
ν
p(ν)Tr [ΠσT (ρ(ν))σ′] (9)
for several σ and σ′, where σ and σ′ are multi-qubit Pauli op-
erators, and p(ν) is a probability where Alice selects ν. Note
that we can assume that Bob’s deviation is performed after the
ideal operation without loss of generality as shown in [3] and
Appendix C. In the FK protocol,
∑
ν
p(ν)ρ(ν) =
(
I
2
)⊗log(dimρ(ν))
is satisfied and then Eq. (9) becomes 0when σ 6= σ′. This fact
is important to complete the proof, and we require property (i)
to use this fact in our proof of verifiability (See Appendix C
for a detailed proof).
As an example that does not satisfy (i), in Fig. 1, we can
replace T |A1〉 and S|A5〉 with |+1〉 and |+2〉, respectively.
Let Bob then prepare |+1〉 and |+2〉 at Bob’s side, similarly
to Ref. [27]. In this example, the correctness and blindness
are satisfied. However, because Bob’s initial states are not
the maximally mixed state from Bob’s viewpoint even in the
ideal case, the verifiability cannot be guaranteed by using the
same argument in Ref. [3]. As another example that does not
satisfy (ii), we can remove the discarding procedure in our
gadget. Even though, the correctness and blindness are satis-
fied similar to the above example, and the success probability
is increased to 1. However, since the prepared state depends
on {si}, Bob can perform deviation depending on the state
prepared by Alice. To avoid such a situation, the discarding
procedure is required. 
From Theorem 2 and Lemma 2, the following theorem im-
mediately holds:
Theorem 4 Our fault-tolerant VBQC protocol satisfies the
verifiability.
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APPENDIX A: THE FK PROTOCOL
In this appendix, we briefly explain the procedure of the FK
protocol [3]. The FK protocol runs as follows:
1. Alice prepares a qubit, and sends it to Bob through a
quantum channel. Alice repeats this procedureN times.
ND of N qubits are each of which chosen from the
Z-basis states uniformly random. We call these qubits
dummy qubits. (N −ND) qubits are each chosen from
{|+k〉}7k=0 uniformly random.
2. Bob generates a randomly-rotated dotted-complete
graph state by entangling N qubits sent from Alice ac-
cording to Alice’s instruction. The randomly-rotated
dotted-complete graph state |RDC〉 is defined as
∏
(i,j)∈E
Λi,j(Z)

N−ND∏
i˜=1
|+ki˜ 〉˜i
N∏
i˜=N−ND+1
|zi˜〉˜i

 .
Here, E is defined as a set of edges of a dotted-
complete graph introduced in Ref. [3], |+ki˜ 〉˜i ≡ (|0〉˜i+
eiki˜pi/4|1〉˜i)/
√
2, and |zi˜′〉i˜′ (zi˜′ ∈ {0, 1}) is the i˜′th Z-
basis state.
3. Alice sends a value of δi′ ≡ k′i′pi/4+φi′+r′i′pi+ni′pi
to Bob through a classical channel, then Bob measures
the i′th qubit (1 ≤ i′ ≤ N, i′ ∈ N) of |RDC〉 in
{|+δi′4/pi〉, |+4+δi′4/pi〉}, and sends the outcome bi′ to
Alice through the classical channel. For any qubits, ri′
is chosen from {0, 1} uniformly random. ni′ is the
number of |1〉, which are neighbors of the i′th qubit
on |RDC〉. To remove the effect of Zni′i′ , the term
ni′pi is necessary. In Ref. [3], the effect of the term
ni′pi is considered in step 1, but in this paper it is
consider in step 3 to make the FK protocol appropri-
ately for our gadget. This modification does not lose
the essential properties of the FK protocol at all. For
each of the dummy qubits, the value of k′i′ is choosen
from {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} uniformly random. For other
qubits whose state is |+ki˜〉, k′i′ = ki˜. For dummy
qubits, φi′ (∈ {kpi/4}7k=0) is chosen uniformly ran-
dom. For other qubits used to perform universal quan-
tum computing, φi′ is chosen according to the quan-
tum algorithm where Alice wants to perform and previ-
ous measurement outcomes as with MBQC. For other
qubits used to perform the verification, i.e., trap qubits,
φi′ is chosen as 0.
4. Alice checks whether or not bi′ = ri′ is satisfied for all
trap qubits. If it is satisfied, Alice accepts the output
of her desired quantum computing. Otherwise, Alice
rejects it.
APPENDIX B: THE PROOF FOR CORRECTNESS OF
OUR FAULT-TOLERANT VBQC PROTOCOL
In this appendix, we derive Table I. Note that we omit the
subscript L of quantum states and operators for the notational
simplicity.
First, we consider step 2. If Alice measures one half
of |Φ+〉 in Z basis and obtains the measurement outcome
oi, X
ai⊕oiZri |oi〉 = (−1)ri·oi |ai〉 is prepared at Bob’s
side. On the other hand, if Alice measures one half of
|Φ+〉 in X basis and obtains the measurement outcome oi,
XriZai⊕oi |+4oi〉 = (−1)ri·ai |+4ai〉 is prepared at Bob’s
side. Hence, |+0〉, |+4〉, |0〉, and |1〉 are prepared at Bob’s
side with probabilities qi/2, qi/2, (1− qi)/2, and (1− qi)/2,
respectively.
Next, we consider step 3. Here, we consider only the case
of si = 0 (i = 1, 2, 4, 5) because in other cases, Bob discards
|B〉. The probability that s1 = s2 = s4 = s5 = 0 is satisfied
is 1/16 independent of the form of |B〉. From a calculation by
taking into account the dependence of |B〉 on {ai} and {ci},
|B〉 is derived as shown in Table I. Below we will explain how
the calculation proceeds. When (c2, c3, c4) = (0, 1, 0), |B〉 is
an eigenstate of X because the 3rd qubit is not connected to
other four qubits. Similarly, when c3 = 0, the 3rd qubit is
not connected to other four qubits, and so |B〉 is an eigenstate
of Z . When |A1〉 is connected to the 3rd qubit through |A2〉
(c1 = c2 = c3 = 1), by measuring T |A1〉 and |A2〉 in X
bases, T or T † is performed on the 3rd qubit up to the byprod-
uct operators via gate teleportation. On the other hand, when
c3 = c4 = c5 = 1, S is performed on the 3rd qubit in a similar
way. When (c1, c2, c3) = (0, 1, 1) or (c3, c4, c5) = (1, 1, 0),
H is performed on the 3rd qubit in the similar way, therefore
|B〉 is an eigenstate of Z . From the above observation, Alice
can prepare |B〉 up to a global phase as in Table I.
APPENDIX C: THE PROOF FOR VERIFIABILITY OF
THE VIRTUAL VBQC PROTOCOL
We employ almost the same method used in Ref. [3]. Note
that we omit the subscript L of quantum states and operators
for the notational simplicity.
A circuit diagram of our fault-tolerant VBQC protocol is
shown in Fig. 4. Bob’s (i′′ + 1)th deviation is denoted by
U (i
′′) (0 ≤ i′′ ≤ N). Particularly, the deviations performed
in the virtual gadget are included in U (0). In Fig. 4,
|A(ν)〉 ≡
N ′⊗
j=1
(|A5j−4〉|A5j−3〉|A5j−2〉|A5j−1〉|A5j〉),
j means the jth repetition of the virtual gadget, EL repre-
sents Bob’s faithful operation before the Z-basis measure-
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FIG. 4: A circuit diagram of our fault-tolerant VBQC protocol including Bob’s deviation U (i
′). The classical message δi′ is
denoted as three-qubit quantum state |δi′〉, and s represents the outcomes in step 2 of the virtual gadget that decide the states of
discarded qubits. The detail of the notations is written in the main text.
ments shown in Fig. 1,
EG(ν) ≡

 ∏
(i,j)∈E
Λi,j(Z)

 ⊗ I⊗N ′−N ,
|junk〉 represents the discarded qubits, and |0〉⊗NB is the an-
cilla qubits, which are used to make Bob’s deviation uni-
tary operators. Here, Alice’s random variable ν represents
the random value ri′ mentioned in step 3 of the FK proto-
col, a(j) ≡ {a5j−4, a5j−3, a5j−2, a5j−1, a5j}, and c(j) ≡
{c5j−4, c5j−3, c5j−2, c5j−1, c5j}. Note that N˜ ofN outcomes
{bi′} represent the output of Alice’s delegated quantum com-
puting. In this proof, we denote the classical bits as quantum
states such as δi′ → |δi′〉. It is known that Bob’s deviation Ui′
does not depend on ν (property (ii) in Remark 1). In order to
calculate the probability of Alice accepting the incorrect out-
put, we postpone Bob’s deviation depicted in Fig. 4 without
changing quantum states just before measurements as shown
in Fig. 5. Now, we define that
T ≡
(
N∏
i′=1
Hi′Zi′(δi′ )
)
EGEL,
T (0) ≡ TE†L,
T (i
′) ≡
N∏
j′=i′+1
Hj′Zj′ (δj′),
Ω ≡
N∏
i′′=0
T (i
′′)U (i
′′)T (i
′′)†,
|Ψ(ν)〉 ≡ |A(ν)〉
(
N⊗
i′=1
|δi′〉
)
.
Here, Zi′(δi′ ) ≡ |0〉〈0|i′ + e−iδi′ |1〉〈1|i′ , and Ω represents
the postponed Bob’s deviation. Note that if Bob is honest, Ω
is the identity operator. Moreover, for simplicity, we define
T (·) ≡ T (·)T †,
W(·) ≡ Ω(·)Ω†.
The output quantum state A(ν) composed of all qubits except
for ancilla qubits can be written as
11
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FIG. 5: A modified circuit diagram of our fault-tolerant VBQC protocol including postponed Bob’s deviation Ω.
A(ν) =
1
pn
TrB
[∑
s,b
P [|0〉⊗4N |s〉]|b′〉〈b|WT (P [|Ψ(ν)〉]⊗ P [|0〉⊗NB ])|b〉〈b′|
]
.
Here, pn is the normalization factor, |s〉 represents the out-
comes in step 2 of the virtual gadget that decide the states of
discarded qubits, the state
|b〉 ≡
N−N˜∏
j˜=1
|bj˜〉j˜
represents the outcomes that are not output of Alice’s dele-
gated quantum computing,
|b′〉 ≡
N−N˜∏
j˜=1
|bj˜ ⊕ rj˜〉j˜ ,
and TrB[·] represents the partial trace over Bob’s ancilla
qubits. Next, we define a projector onto the subspace spanned
by the states of the non-trap qubits used in the FK protocol
that generates incorrect output as Π⊥, and define the set of
positions of the trap qubits as T ′(ν), respectively. The prob-
ability p′incorrect where Alice accepts an incorrect output is
calculated to be
p′incorrect
=
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr[Π⊥P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]A(ν)]
=
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr
[
Π⊥P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
(
1
pn
∑
s,b
P [|0〉⊗4N |s〉]|b′〉〈b|WT (P [|Ψ(ν)〉] ⊗ P [|0〉⊗NB ])|b〉〈b′|
)]
≡ pincorrect
pn
.
We define a Kraus operator χk′ ≡ 〈k′|Ω|0〉⊗NB , where {|k〉} are the normal orthogonal bases for the Hilbert space cor-
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responding to the input state of Fig. 5 except Bob’s ancilla qubits. From this definition,
pincorrect
=
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr
[
Π⊥P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
( ∑
s,b,k′
P [|0〉⊗4N |s〉]|b′〉〈b|χk′T (P [|Ψ(ν)〉])χ†k′ |b〉〈b′|
)]
.
Since the Kraus operator can be written as a liner combination
of the tensor products {σj˜′} of Pauli operators with complex
coefficients, χk′ =
∑
j˜′ αk′ j˜′σj˜′ , where
∑
k′,j˜′ |αk′ j˜′ |2 = 1,
is satisfied. Accordingly,
pincorrect
=
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr
[
Π⊥P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
( ∑
s,b,k′,j˜′,j′′
αk′ j˜′α
∗
k′j′′P [|0〉⊗4N |s〉]|b′〉〈b|σj˜′T (P [|Ψ(ν)〉])σj′′ |b〉〈b′|
)]
=
∑
ν,s,b,k′
p(ν)Tr
[
Π⊥P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
(∑
j˜′
∑
j′′
αk′ j˜′α
∗
k′j′′P [|0〉⊗4N |s〉]|b′〉〈b|σj˜′T (P [|Ψ(ν)〉])σj′′ |b〉〈b′|
)]
=
∑
ν,s,b,k′
p(ν)Tr
[
Π⊥P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
[∑
j˜′
∑
j′′
αk′ j˜′α
∗
k′j′′P [|0〉⊗4N |s〉](⊗t|rt〉)〈b|σj˜′T (P [|Ψ(ν)〉])σj′′ |b〉(⊗t〈rt|)
]]
=
∑
ν,s,b,k′
p(ν)Tr
[
Π⊥P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
(∑
j˜′
∑
j′′
αk′ j˜′α
∗
k′j′′P [|0〉⊗4N |s〉]〈b|σj˜′T (P [|Ψ(ν)〉])σj′′ |b〉
)]
=
∑
ν,s,b′,k′
p(ν)Tr
[
Π⊥P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
(∑
j˜′
∑
j′′
αk′ j˜′α
∗
k′j′′P [|0〉⊗4N |s〉|b′〉]σj˜′T (P [|Ψ(ν)〉])σj′′
)]
≤
∑
ν,s,b′,k′
p(ν)Tr
[
P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
(∑
j˜′
∑
j′′
αk′ j˜′α
∗
k′j′′P [|0〉⊗4N |s〉|b′〉]σj˜′T (P [|Ψ(ν)〉])σj′′
)]
.
Here, b′ ≡ {bj˜ |j˜ 6= t}. We divide ν into νT and its comple-
mentary set ν¯T , where νT represents the position of the trap
qubits, {a(t)}, {c(t)}, and {rt}. Since∑
ν¯T
p(ν¯T )T (P [|Ψ(ν)〉])
= ⊗tP [
∑
sT
√
p(sT )|sT 〉HZ(δt)|Bt〉|δt〉]⊗ (I/2)⊗N˜ ′ ,
where N˜ ′ ≡ 5(N ′−NT )+3(N−NT ) (property (i) in Remark
1),
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pincorrect
≤
∑
νT ,s,b′,k′
p(νT )Tr
[
P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
[∑
j˜′
∑
j′′
αk′ j˜′α
∗
k′j′′P [|0〉⊗4N |s〉|b′〉]σj˜′
(
⊗tP
[∑
sT
√
p(sT )|sT 〉HZ(δt)|Bt〉|δt〉
])
⊗ (I/2)⊗N˜ ′σj′′
]]
=
∑
νT ,k′
p(νT )Tr
[
P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
[∑
j˜′
∑
j′′
αk′ j˜′α
∗
k′j′′P [|0〉⊗4NT ]σj˜′
(
⊗tP
[∑
sT
√
p(sT )|sT 〉HZ(δt)|Bt〉
])
⊗ (I/2)⊗N˜ ′σj′′
]]
. (10)
Here, sT ≡ {s5t−4, s5t−3, s5t−1, s5t}, |Bt〉 is |B〉 that is
a trap qubit, and |Bt〉 depends on sT . We devide νT into
{a(t), c(t)} and its complementary set ν′T . Since
∑
{a(t),c(t)}
p({a(t), c(t)})
(
⊗tP
[∑
sT
√
p(sT )|sT 〉HZ(δt)|Bt〉
)]
= ⊗t
1
4
(
P
[∑
sT
1
4
|sT 〉|rt〉
]
+ P
[∑
sT
1
4
|sT 〉|rt ⊕ s5t−1 ⊕ s5t〉
]
+
1
2
∑
θ′
P
[∑
sT
1
4
|sT 〉Z(−θ′s5t−3)Hs5t−3 |rt ⊕ s5t−4〉
]
+
1
2
∑
θ′
P
[∑
sT
1
4
|sT 〉Z(−θ′s5t−3)Hs5t−3 |rt ⊕ s5t−4 ⊕ s5t−3 ⊕ s5t−1 ⊕ s5t〉
])
≡ E
(
⊗tP
[∑
sT
1
4
|sT 〉|rt〉
])
, (11)
where θ′ ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2}, Eq. (10) is calculated as follows:
pincorrect
≤
∑
ν′T ,k′
p(ν′T )Tr
[
P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
[∑
j˜′
∑
j′′
αk′ j˜′α
∗
k′j′′P [|0〉⊗4NT ]σj˜′
E
(
⊗tP
[∑
sT
1
4
|sT 〉|rt〉
])
⊗ (I/2)⊗N˜ ′σj′′
]]
.
From Eq. (11), E can be treated as TPCP map that is indepen- dent of rt. Accordingly, we can treat E as Bob’s deviation,
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and we define new operatorΩ′ that represents Bob’s deviation including E as follows:
Ω′(·) ≡ TrT

 ∑
k′,j˜′,j′′
αk′ j˜′α
∗
k′j′′P [|0〉4NT ]σj˜′E
(
⊗t
(∑
sT
1
4
|sT 〉
))
σj′′

 (·)
≡
∑
k˜
χ′k˜(·)χ′k˜
†
such that χ′k˜ =
∑
j˜′′ α
′
k˜j˜′′σj˜′′ , where
∑
k˜,j˜′′ |α′k˜j˜′′ |2 ≤ pn.
Here, TrT represents the partial trace over the space spanned
by {|sT 〉}. The reason why
∑
k˜,j˜′′ |α′k˜j˜′′ |2 ≤ pn is the dis-
carding procedure in the virtual gadget. We denote the ac-
tion of σj˜′ on the γth qubit used in the FK protocol by σj˜′′|γ
(1 ≤ γ ≤ N), and define the sets
Aj˜′′ ≡ {γ s.t. σj˜′′|γ = I}
Bj˜′′ ≡ {γ s.t. σj˜′′|γ = X}
Cj˜′′ ≡ {γ s.t. σj˜′′|γ = XZ}
Dj˜′′ ≡ {γ s.t. σj˜′′|γ = Z},
where | · | denotes the number of elements of a set. Note
that we can assume that Bob does not perform the deviation
on |δi′〉 without loss of generality. We define the set of j˜′′,
which satisfies |Bj˜′′ |+ |Cj˜′′ | ≥ d, as Ej˜′′ . Since I and Z do
not affect the outcome of the Z-basis measurement, and we
assume that an error-correcting code that can correct less than
d errors is used in the FK protocol,
pincorrect
≤
∑
ν′T ,k˜
p(ν′T )Tr
[
P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
[ ∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
∑
j′′′∈Ej′′′
α′k˜j˜′′α
′∗
k˜j′′′σj˜′′ (⊗tP [|rt〉])⊗ (I/2)⊗N−NT σj′′′
]]
.
Since if two sigle-qubit Pauli operators σ and σ′ satisfy that σ 6= σ′,∑rt〈rt|σ|rt〉〈rt|σ′|rt〉 = 0,
pincorrect
≤
∑
ν′T ,k˜
p(ν′T )Tr
[
P [⊗t∈T ′(ν)|rt〉]
[ ∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2σj˜′′ (⊗tP [|rt〉])⊗ (I/2)⊗N−NT σj˜′′
]]
=
∑
ν′T ,k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2p(ν′T )
∏
t∈T ′(ν′T )
(〈rt|σj˜′′|t|rt〉)2
=
∑
k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2
∑
T ′
p(T ′)
∏
t∈T ′
1∑
rt=0
p(rt)(〈rt|σj˜′′|t|rt〉)2.
We assume that 3NT = N , and partition the qubits into NT
sets where each of them contains one trap qubit and two non-
trap qubits, respectively. In this time, the position of a trap
qubit in each set is chosen uniformly random. We define |rtγ′ 〉
as a state of a trap qubit that is contained in the γ′th set. Since
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this partition gives the information about the location of trap qubits, this partition increase pincorrect. Accordingly,
pincorrect
≤
∑
k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2
NT∏
γ′=1
∑
tγ′
1∑
rt
γ′
=0
p(tγ′)p(rtγ′ )(〈rtγ′ |σj˜′′|tγ′ |rtγ′ 〉)
2
=
∑
k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2
NT∏
γ′=1
∑
tγ′
1∑
rt
γ′
=0
NT
2N
(〈rtγ′ |σj˜′′|tγ′ |rtγ′ 〉)
2.
We define |Aj˜′′γ′ | as the nunmber of elements that satisfies the
condition of the set Aj˜′′ in the γ
′th set. From this definition,
NT∑
γ′=1
|Aj˜′′γ′ | = |Aj˜′′ |.
This definition is applied for other sets Bj˜′′ , Cj˜′′ , and Dj˜′′ .
From this definition,
pincorrect
≤
∑
k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2
NT∏
γ′=1
NT
2N
2(|Aj˜′′γ′ |+ |Dj˜′′γ′ |)
=
∑
k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2
NT∏
γ′=1
NT
N
(
N
NT
− |Bj˜′′γ′ | − |Cj˜′′γ′ |
)
=
∑
k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2
NT∏
γ′=1
[
1− NT
N
(|Bj˜′′γ′ |+ |Cj˜′′γ′ |)
]
.
From the fact that (1 − gf) ≤ (1 − g)f is satisfied for any non-negative integer f and any real number g,
pincorrect
≤
∑
k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2
NT∏
γ′=1
(
1− NT
N
)|B
j˜′′
γ′
|+|C
j˜′′
γ′
|
=
∑
k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2
(
1− NT
N
)∑NT
γ′=1
|B
j˜′′
γ′
|+|C
j˜′′
γ′
|
=
∑
k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2
(
1− NT
N
)|B
j˜′′
|+|C
j˜′′
|
≤
∑
k˜
∑
j˜′∈E
j˜′′
|α′k˜j˜′′ |2
(
1− NT
N
)d
≤ pn
(
1− NT
N
)d
. (12)
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Since we assume that 3NT = N , from Eq. (12),
p′incorrect ≤
(
2
3
)d
.

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